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The Growth of the Western Region 
2 
The history of new state movements in America is always an 
absorbi~g study; the character of the settlers and the compelling 
factors that motivate them are revealed with startling clarity 
as the reader turns the pages back into the annals of the period. 
The history of America has been, in a large degree, says Frederick 
J. Turner, "the history of the colonization of the Great West. 
The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, 
and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American 
development." 
In no state was the influence of the frontier advance upon 
political development shown more clearly than in ~entucky, the 
first settlement on the "western waters." It is a significant 
feature of this statehood struggle that it did not concern itself 
with purely local considerations but found its greatest impetus 
in a problem of national importance, the free navigation of the 
Mississippi. It is the purpose here to consider the inter-
relation of these two questions and Kentucky's role in their 
solution. 
The migrations to the district were made despite the great 
distance from the older settlements, despite the menace from the 
Indians, and in constant disregard of the fact that Virginia 
could give neither adequate protection nor aid to those who dared 
to take up the life of the pioneer. It is not the purpose here 
to follow the story of the development of the settlement, but it 
is necessary to attempt to discover, if possible, the nature and 
the number of those who were so vigorously to influence the 
history of the western district. 
3 
John Filson, who was to become the first of the recorders 
of the history of Kentucky, said: "We may conclude that Kentucky 
contains, at present (1784), upwards of 30,000 souls, so amaz-
ingly r~pid has been the settlement in a few years. Numbers are 
arriving daily, and multitudes expected this Fall, which gives 
a well-grounded expectation that the country will be exceedingly 
populous in a short time. The inhabitants, at present, have 
not extraordinary good houses., as usual in a newly settled country."l 
The close of the Revolution found a considerable part of 
the district surveyed and rapidly being taken up by grants. 
Real estate was being bought and sold, towns were laid out and 
began to assume respectable size. There was every evidence of 
permanency and healthy development, though the communities had, 
in no phase, lost their pioneer nature. 2 Filson's estimate 
of 30,000 inhabitants is greater than the number attributed to 
the district by more recent historians, but of more importance 
than numbers, in any given year, was the fact of rapid and 
permanent growth. 3 
It is necessary to oonsider, also, that the district did 
not offer sufficient lure to retain all who came into its 
borders. "Perhaps from ten to twenty thousand people a year," 
1. Reprinted in Mississippi Valley Historical Proceedings, 
Vol. VI, p. 112, from Filson, Discovery, Settlement and 
Present state of Kentucke, pp. 28 and 29. 
(A copy of this book is in the Wisoonsin State Historioal 
SOCiety Library.) 
2. For an interesting account by a contemporary writer see 
Gilbert Imlay, A Topographical Description of the Western 
Territory of North Amerioa, 1793, p. 45, fr. 
3. Justin Winsor, in his Westward Movement, Boston, 1897, p. 
178, plaoes the probable number of people in the district 
in 1783 at 12,000. The first Federal census, 1790, ac-
corded to Kentucky 73677 persons. 
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says Roosevelt, "came into Kentucky during the close of the 
Revolutionj but the net gain to the population was much less, 
because there was always a smaller, but almost equally steady, 
counterf~ow of men who, having failed as pioneers, were strug-
gling wearily back to their deserted eastern homes."4 
The student of early Kentucky history is constantly impressed 
with the qualities of leadership exhibited by many of those who 
were coming to make this region their homes. It is a common 
tendency to idealize the pioneer and to impute to him the sterling 
attributes of courage, honesty and sincerity without regard to 
the fact that the same term may apply to the ignorant and 
slothful individual who had drifted away from an older community. 
Such men were not lacking in Kentucky but their presence was 
more than offset by a vigorous, independent element, fully 
capable of assuming leadership in political and economic affairs. 
It is not surprising to find, then, that when differences of 
interests between East and West arose, there was in Kentucky a 
group that could champion ably and earnestly the interests of 
their adopted section. 
With the growth of population, mills began to put in their 
appearance. Their products were to require markets if expansion 
was to continue. From the settled and semi-settled areas about 
the towns, beef, apples, salt and hemp promised profit to 
tne man who could solve the difficult problem of sale for them. 
Aggressive action and decisive steps would be necessary if the 
economic future of the district was not to be thwarted and 
Kentucky to remain an isolated, backward community until such 
time as she would have a population sufficient to absorb her 
4. Roosevelt, Winning of the West, Vol. III, pp. 15 and 16. 
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produc~s. In no such pronounced limitations upon its develop-
ment could a pioneer community be expected to acquiesce, and 
Kentucky was no exception to the rule. 
From the political standpoint alone, Kentucky was experienc-
ing no serious disadvantages. There was no history of arbitrary 
rule by Virginia -- the district was simply administered as 
a county. But as the economic disability attendant upon the 
closed navigation of the Mis s ~ssippi became more marked, 
political considerations began to loom large in the discussions 
in the state. Administration by a government removed by several 
hundreds of miles and under the direction of men who were not 
in touch with local matters caused the Kentuckians to feel that 
their economic salvation lay in statehood. In its simplest 
analysis, then, the history of Kentucky from 1783 to 1789 is the 
history of a section profoundly influenced by a movement for 
statehood which had as its chief object the securing of the free 
navigation of the Mississippi. 
6 
Kentucky and the Mississippi Question 
po 
7 
The question of the control of the Mississippi River and 
Valley was agitated long before there was a population in that 
region sufficient to account for the interest shown. The 
foreign offices, with an ever watchful eye upon the possibility 
of colonial expansion, saw the potential value of the section. 
Madrid had watched with uneasiness the decline of French power 
in America; their common rival, England, was developing with an 
all too irresistible force her place in the New World. To 
Spain the all important problem seemed to be that of maintain-
ing her hold upon the Gulf, both with respect to the colonies 
that surrounded it and the commerce that it carried. 5 England l s 
contraband trade with these colonies was increasing in an alarm-
ing fashion; aggressiveness with respect to trade might well 
be followed by aggressiveness with respect to colonies. 
These conditions weighed heavily in inducing Spain to 
join France in her last struggle with England in America. 
Spanish apprehensions had more definite grounds in the prelim-
inary treaty of 1762 between England and France. 6 France had 
agreed to cede to Great Britain the left bank of the Mississippi 
as far as the River Iberville and the lakes Mauregpas and 
Pontchartrain. 7 This clause would establish the Mississippi 
5. See the statement of Floridablanca, Spanish Minister of 
State, to Jay, the American Commissioner to Spain (Wharton, 
Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution, Vol. IV, pp. 
145 and 146). 
6. Spain seemed to acknowledge the possibility of the defeat of 
the allies in the war with England. See Cantillo Tratados, 
convenios y declaraciones de paz y de commercio, (Translated 
by W. R. Shepherd in his "Ces s ion of Louisiana to Spain," 
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XIX, p. 440.) 
7. William MacDonald, Documentary Source Book of American 
History, New York, 1916. 
as the boundary between Louisiana and Canada and would give 
to Great Britain easy access to the sea. The possibility of 
such an outlet for Great Britain upon the Gulf of Mexico 
immediately awakened protest from Spain. 8 
But news had come that Havana had fallen to the British 
8 
and her commissioners were in a position to demand more severe 
terms. Spain must cede Porto Rico or all the Floridas if she 
wished to regain Havana. Engl~nd must also have freedom of 
ascent as well as descent of the river " 
• • • • it being 
distinctly understood that the navigation of the Mississippi 
~iver is to be equally free to the subjects of Great Britain 
and France, in its whole breadth and extent, from its source 
to the sea, and particularly that part between the said 
island of New Orleans and the right bank of the river, as well 
as the entrance and departure by its mouth."9 
Then, suddenly, France made a most surprising move. To 
make it possible for Spain to retain Florida, France offered 
Louisiana to England as a substitute. We are perhaps well 
within reason in conjecturing that France felt that she was 
giving up a burdensome province. But England was unwilling 
to accept the substitution. So with all the formality common 
to such occasions Louis XV wrote a personal letter to Charles 
III offering Louisiana to Spain. The terms of the cession 
were soon drawn uP. The preliminary convention of November 3, 
1762, said: "The most Christian King, being firmly resolved 
to strengthen and perpetuate the bonds of tender amity which 
8. Simancas Estado, Legajo 4551, Wall, Minister of State to 
Grimaldi, Ambassador to England, August 2, 1762. Translated 
by Shepherd, Political Science Quarterly Vol. XIX, p. 440. 
9. Benjamin F. French, Historical Documents of Louisiana, 
New York, 1846, Vol. V, p. 240. 
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unite him to his cousin, the Catholic King ••• cedes in 
entire possession, purely and singly, without exception, to his 
Catholic Majesty and his successors, in perpetuity all of the 
country known under the name of Louisiana, as well as New Orleans 
and the island in whic;h the place stands." IO 
For Spain the possessio~ of Louisiana might easily be a 
cause for trouble. There was the problem of the French inhab-
itants and there was a possibility of trouble with England 
over it. On the other hand it was not a gift to be lightly 
• 
rejected. The Mississippi could serve as a demarcation line 
for the Spanish territories; it might be the means of checking 
English advance into other western areas. Nor was it necessary 
to reckon the province of Louisiana as an economic liability; 
New Orleans alone could be compensation for administrative 
losses elsewhere. 
To the district and state of Kentucky that was to be, the 
cession was of untold consequence. Had France retained it the 
probability is that it would have become a British possession 
in the period 1789-1815. Shepherd, in his excellent study 
of the cession, previously referred to, says that all conditions, 
geographical, economiC, political and social, pointed to the 
formation of two confederacies, one along the Atlantic seaboard 
and one along the Mississippi. With England intrenched beyond 
tpe Mississippi, the history of the settlements on the "western 
waters" might have taken a very different course. 
The treaty between England and France was finally con-
cluded on February 10, 1763. "It is agreed that, for the 
future, the confines between the territory of his Britannic 
10. ibid., Vol. V, pp. 235 and 236. 
10 
Majesty, and those of his most Christian majesty, in that 
part of the world, shall be fixed irrevocably by a line drawn 
along the middle of the river ississippi, from its source 
to the river Iberville, and from thence by a line drawn along 
the middle of this river, and the lakes Maurespas and 
Pontchartrain, to the sea; and for this purpose, the most 
Christian king cedes in full right, and guarantees to his 
Britannic majesty, the river and port of the Mobile, and every-
thin~ which he now possesses, or ought to possess, on the left 
side of the river Mississippi, except the town of New Orleans, 
and the island on which it is situated, which shall remain to 
France; provided, that the navigation of the river Mississippi 
shall be equally free, as well to the subjects of Great Britain 
as to those of France, in its whole breadth and length, from 
its source to the sea, and expressly that part which is between 
the said island of New Orleans and the right bank of that river, 
as well as the passage both in and out of its mouth. It is 
further stipulated that the vessels belonging to the subjects 
of either nation shall not be stopped, visited or subjected 
to the payment of any dues whatsoever." ll Spain, through her 
recent acquisition of the Louisiana country, would have this 
privilege of navigation granted to France. Conversely, Great 
Britain's right to the navigation would be unimpaired by the 
transfer of Louisiana. These facts are important in the light 
of later changes in the territorial status of the two countries. 
During the American Revolution, Spain's diplomacy seems largely 
to have been controlled by a desire to protect her Louisiana 
11. Treaty of Paris, February 10, 1763, Art. VIr (MacDonald, 
Documentary Source Book of American History). 
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possessions.12 To insure her control over that region, a rigid 
domination of the Mississippi was deemed necessary. America was 
particularly anxious to secure Spanish aid during the war and 
Congress, on December 30, 1776, passed a resolution: "That if 
his Catholic majesty will join with the United States in a war 
against Great Britain, they will assist in reducing to the 
possession of Spain the tovm and harbor of Pensacola, provided 
the inhabitants of the United States shall have the free naviga-
tion of the Mississippi and the use of the harbor of Pensacola. u13 
The alliance between France and Spain was the occasion for 
persistent activity by Vergennes to secure cooperation from Spain. 
But Floridablanca, who had recently become the chief Spanish 
Minister of State, as persistently avoided the alliance. 14 
Until her declaration of war against Great Britain in 
1779, Spain had not concerned herself with the Mississippi 
Question. Apparently she admitted the English right to the nav-
igation, but had she not, the undeveloped nature of the western 
country would have precluded controversy. But war with England 
meant the possibility of regaining Florida which would tend to 
reestablish Spain in her old preeminent place in the Caribbean. 
Likewise, the success of the United States would mean a more 
rapid advance into the West. Once more the Mississippi assumed 
a place of importance in diplomatic considerations. 
12. Temple Bodley, History of Kentucky, 4 Vols., Louisville, 
1928, Vol. I, p. 215 f. 
13. Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution, Blair Edition, 
Washington, 1837, Vol. II, p. 304. 
14. For an account of the diplomatic manoeuvering of the three 
countries, France, Spain and the United States, see Justin 




The official Spanish observer, Juan de Mivalles, wrote to his 
home office as follows: "Having arranged to confer in my house 
and in that of the French minister with the new President of 
Congress (John Jay) and various members of it, I have explored 
(and the said plenipotentiary conspired to the same end) the 
idea which they hold as to the territory which the Americans 
have taken from the English in the interior of the province 
of LouiSiana, Illinois, etc •• . • • • That the right which they 
have acquired from the English by conquest would give them the 
facility of exporting their produce by the Mississippi River 
which flows into the Gulf of Mexico." 15 
America was promised no help from France in obtaining 
any of her claims to the western country. Gerard, in a letter 
to Congress, dated May 22, 1779, said: liThe success of the war 
being alone able to fix the fate of empires, it has been found 
impossible , on concluding the treaty of alliance, to determine 
the possessions that the United States may obtain on making 
peace; consequently the engagement .of France can only be con-
ditional and eventual on this subject .••• She is not now 
held to any particular engagement in relation to these posses-
sions, whether real or pretended." He then said that "the claims 
to western lands were founded only upon far-fetched inductions 
subject to discussion and contradiction." l6 
Though discouraged by France and receiving no hint of 
support by Spain, Congress went ahead in its plans for estab-
lishing a control over the western territory. The committee 
• 15. Yela, Espana anta la independencia de los Etadns Unidos, 
Vol. I, p. 387. (Reprinted in Samuel Flagg BemiS, Pinckney's 
Treaty, Baltimore, 1926, p. 15. 
16. Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolut ion, 
Vol. III, p. 174. 
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appointed for the purpose presented its report upon the western 
boundaries to be asked for as "Southerly as the boundary 
settled between Georgia and East and West Florida; and westerly 
by the River Mississippi. 17 A later report was more exact: 
tiThe middle of the River Mississippi from its source to that 
part of the said river which lies in latitude 31 degrees north 
from the equator, then by a line drawn due east to the River 
Apalachicola or Catahouche, thence to the junction thereof 
with the flint river, then in a strait line to the head of st. 
Mary 1 s River, and thence by a line along the middle of St. 
Mary's River to the Atlantic Ocean.,,18 
With reference to the freedom of navigation of the 
Mississippi, the report of February 23 read: "That the navi-
gation of the River Mississippi, as low down as the Southern 
boundary of the United States, be acknowledged and ratified 
absolutely free to the subjects of the United States. 
"That free commerce be allowed to the subjects of the 
United States with some port or ports below the southern 
boundary of the said states, on the River Mississippi; except 
for such articles as may be particularly enumerated.,,19 
Congress, in committee of the whole, modified this to 
read: "That the navigation of the River Mississippi be 
acknowledged and ratified absolutely free to the subjects of 
the United States.,,20 
Now that Congress was beginning to assert itself in the 
matter, the next consideration would be an understanding with 
17. Journal of the Continental Congress (1823) Vol. XIII, p. 241. 
(February 23, 1779). 
18. ibid., Vol. XIII, p. 329 (March 17, 1779). 
19. ibid., Vol. XIII, p. 242. 
20. ibid., Vol. XIII, p. 330. 
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Spain. A loan would be very acceptable, military aid could be 
used. Perhaps we might promise them Florida for the precious 
right of navigation. On September 10, 1779, Spain declared war 
on Great Britain; on September 27, Jay was commissioned to go 
to Madrid and instructions were issued to him.2l The first in-
struction stated that in case the king of Spain would accede to 
the Franco-American Alliance, he should not, by any agreement, 
be prevented from securing, the Floridas. We would, in fact guar-
antee the Floridas to him if he could get them from Great Britain, 
provided we were guaranteed the freedom of the navigation of the 
Mississippi to the sea. The third instruction was to obtain, 
if possible, a port on the 31st parallel, on the Mississippi, 
as a place of deposit for American goods. 22 Jay arrived in 
Spain January 27, 1780. He found Floridablanca willing to talk 
informally but there was no indication of his intention to 
recommend the recognition of the United States, nor to enter 
into any contract which might imply such recognition. The con-
ferences and negotiations entered into by Jay and the discour-
aging reception received by him do not concern us here. It is 
our purpose to discover the results of his efforts. When Jay 
reached Spain the Spanish campaign against Florida was well 
under way. There seemed little likelihood that the 31st 
parallel would be acceptable to Spain as the northern boundary 
o.f West Florida and it was even less probable that she would 
yield on the Mississippi question. Jay, in reporting a 
conversation with Floridablanca said, "He then proceeded to 
observe that there was but one obstacle from which he 
21. Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty, p. 28. 
22. Journal of the Continental Congress, Vol. XV, pp. 1118 and 
1119. 
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apprehended any great difficulty in forming a treaty with 
America, and plainly intimated that this arose from the preten-
sions of America to the navigation of the Mississippi. He ex-
pressed his uneasiness on this subject and entered largely into 
the views of Spain with respect to the boundaries. • • • He 
spoke amply of the King's anxiety, resolution and firmness on 
this point ••• from which his Majesty would never recede."23 
Jay presented the westerne~s' case when he said that, " ••• 
the Americans, almost to a man, believed that God Almighty had 
made that river a highway for the people of the upper country 
to go to the sea by; that this country was extensive and 
fertile; that the general, many officers and others of distinc-
tion and influence in America were deeply interested in it; 
that it would rapidly settle, and that the inhabitants would 
not readily be convinced of the justice of being obliged either 
to live without foreign commodities, or lose the surplus of 
their productions, or to be obliged to transport both over 
rugged mountains and through an immense wilderness to and from 
the sea, when they daily saw a fine river flowing before their 
doors and offering to save them all the trouble and expense, 
and that without injury to Spain." Any lingering hope that 
Jay might have been entertaining must have been dispelled when 
he was told in an interview on September 23, 1780, that" • • • 
upless Spain could exclude all nations from the Gulf of Mexico, 
they might as well admit all; that the King would never 
relinquish it; that the minister regarded it as the proper 
object to be obtained by the war; and, that obtained he should 
be perfectly easy whether or no Spain procured any other cession; 
23. Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. IV, p. 135. 
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that be considered it far more important than the acquisition of 
Gibraltar. ,,24 
In February, 1781, Congress altered its instructions to 
Jay with reference to the navigation of the river below the 31st 
parallel and on a free port below this line, but be was still 
to insist upon the free navigation of the river above the point. 
He protested, in a letter to Congress, that nothing was to be 
gained by the lessened demands. 25 Nevertheless, he obeyed his 
instructions, and presented to Spain certain formal propositions, 
of which three of the articles were: 
"VI. The United States shall relinquish to his Catholic 
majesty, and in future forebear to use, or attempt to use, the 
navigation of the river Mississippi from the thirty-first 
degree of north latitude, that .is, from the point where it 
leaves the United States, down to the ocean. 
"VII. That his Catholic majesty shall guarantee to the 
United States all their respective territories. 
"VIII. That the United States shall guarantee to his Catholic 
majesty all his dominions in America.,,26 
Jay made this offer contingent upon Spainls acceptance 
if she did not accept, we would reserve the right to the 
navigation. Spain made her choice; she remained firm in her 
position that the control of the Spanish dominions must not be 
m~naced. The American plea had been ably and persistently 
advanced but the lure of empire was still strong in the Spanish 
mind. It was with relief that Jay received instructions to 
proceed to Paris to discuss a treaty with England. And with 
him the scene of navigation activities was shifted. Here 
24. ibid. , Vol. IV, pp. 145 and 146. 
25. ibid. , Vol. IV, p. 743. 
26. ibid. , Vol. IV, p. 760. 
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agaIn Jay was forced to battle with the combination of powers 
that would limit the western territory of the United States. 
France and Spain worked shrewdly and systematically toward the 
goal of securing for Spain the country on the east bank of the 
Mississippi. 27 He well knew what it would mean for the future 
of the United States if England's demand for the Northwest 
country and Spain's demand for the Southwest was met. Jay's 
courageous action in entaring into direct negotiations with 
England is a well-known story. By it he avoided the danger of 
America's being overwhelmed in the treaty negotiations by the 
machinations of her associates in the war. 
He did this in the face of a passive attitude rather wide-
spread in the East. While still in Spain he had received a 
letter from Gouverneur Morris ~hich in part read, " ••• The 
difference between us appears to be absurd, in every point of 
view, at least on our part 
• • • We ask a territory and a 
navigation. The territory we cannot occupy, the navigation we 
cannot enjoy. We cannot occupy this territory at present 
or in future, at present because we have not the men; in future 
because we cannot govern it. The most that we can expect 
is an emigration from the old world, whereof one hundredth, 
or perhaps not so much, shall be our descendants, will claim 
title under us to a part of the soil and then set up 
independence ••• 
"As to navigation of the Mississippi, everybody knows 
that the current will forever prevents ships from sailing up, 
however easily they may float down. NOw, unless some new 
27. Justin Winsor, Narrative and Critical History of .the 
United States, Boston, 1884, Vol. VII, p. 118. 
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dragon shall be found, whose teeth sown on the banks of the 
Ohio, will produce seamen, I know not where else they may be 
obtained to navigate ships abroad which can never return home. 
tlBut if the navigation were as easy and advantageous as it 
is useless and impracticable, its effect would be only the 
sooner to dissolve all commercial connections between us and 
the sooner to produce every unhappy consequence.,,28 
Franklin had written. in quite a different tone: "Poor as 
we are, yet as I know we shall be rich, I would rather agree 
with them to buy at a great price the whole of their right on 
the Mississippi, than sell a drop of its waters. A neighbor 
might as well ask me to sell my street door.,,29 
The negotiations with the British were greatly influenced 
by the events of the Revolutio~ary period. With the discussions 
narrowed down to the two parties, progress was more rapid. On 
the navigation question England was quite willing to recognize 
our demands. Article VIII of the treaty of 1783 reads: "The 
navigation of the River Mississippi from its source to the 
ocean shall remain forever free and open to all the subjects 
of Great Britain and the citizens of the United States." 
The incomplete kno~ledge of the geography of the section 
had given rise to the impression that the Mississippi had its 
source in Canadian territory. With respect to our right to 
n~vigate the Mississippi to its mouth, our claim seemed to 
lack substance. England had granted us that which she did not 
possess, that is, a right to the river within Spanisb territory. 
Her claim to the navigation at its mouth bad been invalidated 
28. Jared Sparks, Life of Gouveneur Morris, Boston, 1832, p. 225. 
29. Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. IV, p. 75. 
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by the loss of the southern territory to Spain. She was now 
completely removed, territorially, from the river. By what 
argument could America lay claim to Spanish waters from a treaty 
with England? A far more tenable claim was the economic 
necessity of securing an outlet for ~he western districts. 
Such economic rights are usually secured by one of two methods, 
aggressive action or mutual concessions. Which course would 
America take? 
The general negotiations at Paris included also the British 
treaty with Spain by which the latter country received Florida. 
Between Spain and the United States, however, no understanding 
was reached. The boundary question and the navigation question 
were to be points of contention for many more years with the 
action transferred to yet anotber stage -- the United States. 
20 
The Movement for Statehood in Kentucky 
21 
As has been previously suggested the movement for statehood 
in Kentucky was the result of an ever increasing conviction that 
the problems confronting the district could never be solved as 
long as it remained a part of Virginia. Foremost among these 
problems should be placed the necessity of securing the free 
navigation of the Mississippi. The solution of that difficulty 
does not belong in this chapter but its consideration must be 
kept in the mind of the reader as it was ever present in the 
mind of the Kentuckian of that period. There were other econom-
• 
ic considerations. The scarcity and depreciation of the currency, 
the first resulting to a considerable degree from the isolated 
condition of the region, and the second a result of Virginia 
impoverisbment following the war, were evils that might 
be remedied by forming a state government unhampered by the 
encumbrances of an earlier day. Again it was not a question of 
Virginia's unwillingness to provide adequately for her western 
county but rather of her inability to do so. 
Much of the lack of knowledge in Virginia relative to 
Kentucky can be attributed to the great distance intervening; 
to a lesser degree the lack of understanding can be attributed 
to the same cause. The frontiersman, accustomed to meeting his 
problems with prompt and decisive action, rebelled against the 
slow-moving machinery of a more conservative government. The 
westerner would solve the problem of Indian attacks by vigorous 
retaliation which would discourage such raids; but the Virginia 
government forbade these expeditions both across the Ohio and 
into the territory to the South. Restraint and delay were 
p 
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unappreciated elements in a land that offered so much independence 
and that reckoned action preferable to inaction. 
The first appearance of the new state movement was, to a 
certain extent, prophetic of the future. The situation seems 
to have been marked by discontent, but discontent unaccompanied 
by constructive political ideas. 30 
This first separatist movement made little headway and the 
later movements were furt~ered by a different type of leaders. 
The division of the region into three counties and their 
organization into a judicial district of Virginia was the out-
standing political change res~lting from the early discontent. 3l 
The conclusion of the treaty of peace with England was 
followed by a tremendous migration to Kentucky. The fact that 
England had promised to give up the Northwest posts was taken 
to mean less likelihood of Indian attacks. The migration 
30. Temple Bodley, who has contributed so much to the study of 
Kentucky history, considers the movement as having been 
influenced largely by those who had left eastern homes to 
avoid taxation and military service and were thinking more 
of disestablishing one government than of establishing 
another. (Bodley, Kentucky, Vol. I, p. 279). 
He prints the following petition found in the Virginia 
State Library Collection (Loose) signed by fi f ty six of 
the new settlers who had come out in 1780: "We must lie 
under the disagreeable necessi~y of going down the 
Mississippi to the Spanish protection or becoming tenants 
to private gentlemen who have men employed at this juncture 
in this country at one hundred pounds per thousand for run-
ning around the land which is too rough a medicine ever to 
be digested by any set of people who have suffered as we have." 
This prejudice of the Pennsylvania settlers against the 
Virginia government and the earlier Virginia landholders 
is also illustrated by t r e letter of George Rogers Clark to 
his father, dated August 23, 1780, " ••• The partisans in 
those countries are again soliciting me to lead them as 
their Governor General, as all those from foreign states 
are for a new government; but my duty obliging me to 
suppress all such proceedings, I shall consequently lose 
the interest of that party." (Original letter in the 
Ballard Thruston collection of George Rogers Clark Papers). 
31. William Waller Hening, Statutes of Virginia at Large, 
13 Vols., Richmond, 1819, Vol. X, p. 315. 
was probably of a much higher order than that at the begin-
ning of the decade. It came largely from Virginia and con-
tained many officers and men from the Revolutionary armies. 
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But the hope of comparative security from Indian attacks was 
premature. The order of Congress cutting down the army to fifty-
five at west Point and twenty-six at Pittsburgh, together with 
the unsettled conditions during the negotiations with the 
Indians, produced a situa.tion filled with real danger. 
Another factor contributing to the unrest was a political 
one. The desire for local self-government found in the 
Holston settlements of western North Carolina and in the 
Transylvania settlement in Kentucky was equally strong in this 
period. 32 
The particular oircumstance that produced the first defin-
ite step toward statehood was a threatened invasion by the 
Cherokees in 1784. There seemed to be little possibility of 
concerted action for defense among the settlers, so Benjamin 
Logan, senior colonel after the retirement of General George 
Rogers Clark, issued a call to the heads of all military organ-
izations to meet at Danville in November of that year to con-
sider the situation. The assembled militiaman's convention 
found the immediate danger less pressing than at first reported 
but recognized that the question of defense was still unsolved 
~nd urgent. 33 A second convention, to meet in December (1784) 
32. For a study of "particularism" as an element in the 
pioneer's social concept, see Arthur P. Whitaker, The 
Spanish-American Frontier, Boston, 1927, p. 94. 
33. A motion for immediate separation was made but was not 
passed. This resolution read that Kentucky "when independent 
ought to be taken into the Union with the United States." 
(Draper MSS 11 J 37, reprinted in Littell, Political Transac-
tions In and Concerning Kentucky). 
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was decided upon and to this convention each militia company was 
allowed one delegate. At this convention a resolution to the 
effect that Kentucky should be separated from Virginia and 
admitted to the Confederation was passed and was ordered to be 
sent to the General Assembly of Virginia. A third convention, 
to meet in April (1785) was to bring a mandate from the people. 
The Journal of this Convention contains the petition sent to 
Virginia as well as the address sent to the people of Kentucky, 
setting forth the reasons for the desired separation. The 
petition and the address emphasized the lack of power to call 
out the militia, the lack of an executive power located in the 
district, and the impossibility of receiving benefits of govern-
ment at so great a distance from the capital. The address also 
stressed the great difference in the economic interests of the 
two sections. 34 
The proceedings of the third convention indicate that the 
chief motive of the early statehood demand, protection, had 
given way to the broader and more deeply rooted plea of 
separation for development. 
Humphrey Marshall said of th~ petition and the address: 
" ••• If the petition to the legislature could be accused 
of a deficient portrait~e of grievance; and a too great 
reliance on matter of right, and a sense of duty -- the address 
to the people ran some risk of falling into the opposite 
extremes, and comprised under the domination of facts, a 
variety of topics, presented in a drapery calculated to affect 
their feelings -- awaken their fears -- and infuse into their 
minds disaffection towards the existing state of things, and 
34. The Journal is printed in Littell, Political Transactions, 
Appendix, Nos. I and II, pp. 61-66. 
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the government of Virginia; from th~ misdeeds of which, no longer 
to be borne, they were taught to believe that a separation, 
and it alone, could relieve them." 35 
The resolutions adopted at the August Convention were 
similar to those of the preceding convention. The concluding 
resolution read: "Resolved, therefore, That it is the indespen-
sable duty of this convention, as they regard the prosperity and 
happiness of their constituents, themselves and posterity, to 
make application to the General Assembly, at the ensuing session, 
for an Act to separate this district from the present government 
forever on terms honorable to both and injurious to neither; 
in order that it may enjoy all the advantages, privileges and 
iIDIilunities of a free, sovereign and independent republic.,,36 
~he petition which accompanied the resolution likewise 
seemed to embody a firm conviction of the necessity for estab-
• • • 'Tis not ill-directed or lishing an independent state. II 
inconsiderate zeal of a few, 'tis not that impatience of power 
to which ambitious minds are prone; nor yet the baser consider-
ations of personal interest which influence the people of 
Kentucky ••• (they) are now impelled by ~xpanding evils, and 
irremediable grievances, universally seen, felt and acknowledged, 
to obey the irresistible dictates of self preservation and · 
seek for happiness by means honorable to themselves, to 
-y:ou, and injurious to neither. u37 
It was not to be opposition from Virginia that was to stand 
35. Humphrey Marshall, History of Kentucky, Frankfort, 1824, 
2 Vols., Vol. I, p. 206. 
36. The Journal of the Convention (Brown, Political 
Beginnings of Kentucky, Appendix, No.3). 
37. Littell -- Appendix No. III, p. 69. 
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in the way of Kentucky's attaining her goal. The administra-
tion problem was a difficult one for the older district and 
time might well make it more serious. In Jantary, 1786", the 
General Assembly passed an act providing for the separation of 
Kentucky from the mother state and the erection of the District 
into a "State of the Confederation." The will of the people of 
Kentucky was to be ascertained through a convention to meet on 
the fourth Monday of September 1786. If the action of Virginia 
was agreeable to the Kentuckians, the assembled convention was 
to fix a date prior to September 1, 1787, when the authority of 
Virginia should cease. But in order to consummate the transfer 
of authority, Congress should, before June 1, 1787, agree to 
the entrance of the district into the Union as an independent 
state. 38 The continuation of authorized government was pro-
vided for in the requirement that the convention of September, 
1786, should call a convention to meet prior to September 1, 
1787, to draw up a constitution and to provide rules and regula-
tions for the district until that constitution should go into 
effect. 
But the course of separation was not so smooth. Virginia 
repealed her separation act and called for the election of 
delegates to yet another convention to be held in September, 
1787, to pass again upon the question of separation. This 
second act stated that "it continues to be the purpose of the 
general assembly that the said district shall become an 
independent state on the terms and conditions specified in the 
act aforesaid" but it was apparent that the delegates "have been 
38. Hening, Vol. XII, pp. 37-40. 
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hindered by unforeseen events from meeting at the time proposed 
and determining the question referred to them; and it is con-
sidered that no such determination can now take place within 
the time necessary for its receiving the assent of Congress 
prior to the first day of June next and as required by the 
act."39 In case this second act was ratified in Kentucky, then 
a day not later than the first day of January, 1789, should be 
selected upon which to ~ake the transfer of authority. The 
date for the acceptance by Congress should be not later than 
the fourth day of July, 1788. 
In the convention of September, 1787, • 
• • • • • • • • • 
with little debate it was decided, without a dissenting vote, 
to be expedient for the good people 'of this district that it 
should be separated from the rest of the state upon the terms 
and conditions prescribed by law. 40 In conformity with the 
directions of the General Assembly, an address was sent to 
Congress, petitioning for the admission of Kentucky.4l 
Despite the numerous and exasperating delays, the general 
attitude in Kentucky seems to have been one of patient yet 
persistent interest. The address prepared by Innes, Muter, 
Sebastian and Bro\vn has been quoted to indicate the wrath 
of the western country.42 But the strongest statement in the 
circular is no more than a vigorous protest against possible 
ipdifference in Congress. " ••• We hope to see such an 
exertion made, upon this important occasion, as may convince 
39. Hening, Vol. XII, p. 240. 
40. Marshall, Kentucky, Vol. I, p. 275. 
41. Littell -- Political Transactions, Appendix, No. XIII. 
42. Humphrey Marshall and Thomas Marshall Green (The Spanish 
Conspiracy) have interpreted the address as a dangerous 
and inflammatory document. 
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Congress that the inhabitants of the western country are united 
in the opposition, and consider themselves entitled to all the 
blessings of freemen, and those blessings provided by the 
revolution, and will no t tamely submit to an act of oppression, 
which would tend to a deprivation of jus'J:; rights and privileges." 
The impatience of the frontiersman when he considers the 
injustices attendant upon delay is proverbial. Turner in 
a chapter upon "Pioneer Ideals," repeatedly emphasizes 
the pioneer's irritation at the handicaps imposed upon him 
by civilization which does not realize his problems. " • • • 
the pioneer fought his way across the continent, masterful 
and wasteful, preparing the way by seeking the immediate thing, 
rejoicing in rude strength and wilful aChievement." 43 In 
that light we "can understand the tenor of the following letter 
used as a circular: "Preparations are now making here (if 
necessary) to drive" the Spaniards from their settlements, at 
the mouth of the Missis s ippi. In case we are not countenanced 
and seconded by the United States (if we need it) our allegi-
ance will be thrown off, and some other power applied to. 
Great Britain stan~s ready, wi t h open arms to receive and sup-
port us. They have already offered to open their resources for 
our supplies. When once reunited to them Ifarewell, a long 
farewell', to all your boasted greatness. The province of 
Canada, and the inhabitants of those waters of themselves, in 
time, will be able to conquer you. You are as ignorant of 
this country as Great Britain was of America. These hints, if 
rightly improved, may be of some service; if not, blame yours elves 
43. Frederick J. Turner, The Frontier in American History, 
New York, 1921, p. 270. 
• 
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for the neg1ect.,,44 
Though irritation existed, the counsel of leadership was 
for a quiet but steady prosecution of the district1s interest. 
It was felt that a representative living at the capital would 
help the cause of admission. The Virginia assembly was asked 
to appoint such a man and complied by selecting John Brown, 
who had been a judge for the Kentucky district. 45 A resolution 
to the effect that Kentucky should be admitted was prepared by 
Brown and submitted to Congress February 29, 1788. The matter 
was delayed in committee, a forerunner olf the series of vexing 
delays that followed. We find that reference to the question 
was made on March 4, May 30, June 2, June 3, and finally upon 
July 2. By that time word had been officially received that 
the ninth state had ratified the Constitution, whereupon 
Congress voted to discharge the committee appointed to look in-
• • • • to the matter and passed the following resolution: " 
as the Constitution of the United States is now ratified, 
Congress thinks it unadvisable to adopt any further measures 
for admitting the district of Kentucky into the Federal 
Union as an independent member thereof under the Articles of 
Confederation and perpetual Union, but that Congress think 
it expedient that the said district be made a separate state, 
and member of the Union, as soon after proceedings shall 




It was a terrific blow at Kentucky1s hopes for early 
44. Secret Journals of Congress, Vol. IV, p. 320, Boston, Wait, 
1821. 
45. Richard Collins, History of Kentucky, 2 Vo1s., Covington, 
1882, Vol. I, p. 328. 
46. Journals of Congress, Vol. IV, 830. 
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admission. The dissatisfaction which had been smoldering among 
the more belligerent might now more easily be fanned into 
flame. The official proclamations likewise took on a more 
assertive tone. A convention called previous to the reception 
of the news, met at Danville on July 28. The preamble to the 
resolution adopted there reads as follows: flWhereas it appears 
to the members of this convention, that the United States in 
Congress assembled~ have for the present declined to ratify 
th~ compact entered into between the legislature of Virginia 
and the people of the district respecting the erection of the 
district into an independent state; in consequence of which the 
powers vested in this convention are dissolved & whatever 
order or resolution they pass cannot be considered as having 
any legal force or obligation, but being anxious for the safety 
and prosperity of ourselves and constituents, do earnestly 
recommend to the good people inhabiting the several counties 
within the said district each to elect five representatives 
on the times of holding their court in the month of October 
next to meet at Danville, on the first Monday in November 
following, to continue in office until the first day of January, 
1790, and that they delegate to their said representatives full 
powers to take such measures for obtaining admission of the 
district as a separate and independent member of the United 
States of America, and the navigation of the river Mississippi, 
as may appear most conducive to those important purposes: 
and also to form a constitution of government for the district, 
and organize the same when they shall judge it necessary, 
or to do and accomplish whatever, on a consideration of the 
state of the district, may in their opinion promote its 
31 
interests. 1147 
The wording of the resolution gives rise to conjecture. 
The phrase "to take measures for obtaining the navigation 
of the Mississippi" might be interpreted in whatever fashion 
the reader. views the situation. It is true that negotiations 
with Spain could not legally be undertaken by the people of 
the district but certainly efforts might be made to that 
effect through the 'agencies of the United States. The im-
portance attached to the free navigation of the river was no 
new thing. It had been one of the strongest elements in the 
agitation for statehood. With the news of the action of 
Congress so recently received, there is small wonder that the 
expression of opinion should contain vigorous mention of this 
most vital subject connected with their economic welfare. To 
"form a constitution of government" was no more than to follow 
the suggestion of the Virginia assembly. With such a step 
taken, a renewal of their negotiations with Congress might be 
. hastened. The decision of Congress earlier in the month had 
no discouraging tone; there had been an expression of good-
will for their next effort. Nor would the resolution to 
"accomplish whatsoever. • • may in their opinion promote its 
(Kentucky1s) interests," imply more than a gesture of determi-
nation to proceed along the lines previously laid down. 
The action of the Convention called for the following November 
would seem to bear out this contention. 
The record is given minutely in the Journal of the 
Convention. 48 Practically all of the business was carri ed on in 
47. Kentucky Gazette, September 6, 1788. 
48. Full extracts may be found in John Mason Bro~1n, Political 
Beginnings in Kentucky, Louisville, 1889, pp. 257-263. 
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the committee of the whole. Resolutions were offered to prepare 
addresses to the Virginia Assembly and to Congress, the first 
relative to separation according to the suggestion of Congress 
the second with reference to possible action by Congress in 
securing the navigation of the Mississippi. It was vigorous, but 
not threatening. The even temper and well-ordered plan of the 
leaders of Kentucky seem clearly given in the resolution of-
fered by Brown. "That it is the wish and interest of the good 
people of this district to separate from the state of Virginia, 
and that the same be erected into an independent member of the 
Federal Union." 
The ambitions of a frontier region had been thwarted 
by the caution and selfishness of a more highly developed area. 
But the political problem of statehood was but an indication 
of a more perplexing economic problem of markets and transporta-
tion. The demand for the free navigation of the Mississippi 
could not be shelved; it was vital to the very life of the West. 
And it is to that story of the West that we now turn. 
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Kentuckians and Spaniards 




When a people accustomed to the unrestrained life of the 
frontier begin to evolve into an organized community, they are 
likely to carryover with them into the new era their old 
habits of suspicion of the outsider, of quick judgments, and of 
impatience with "the law's delay." Such is the story of the 
so-called "Spanish " Conspiracy. " It was not an insidious 
intrigue, not a breaking of faith with their countrymen of the 
East, but simply a collection of precipitate acts, of impulsive 
statements, which maturity should have learned to tolerate in 
youth. Disgruntled individuals there were, no doubt, and self-
ish persons who would not have hesitated to sell their 
country's welfare, but they were isolated cases, such as may 
be found anywhere, and at any time. The Mississippi River, 
placid and unruffled ordinarily, but capable of sweeping before 
it every vestige of material development when it becomes 
turbulent, was the cause of this disaffection. And as the 
spring freshets can pile up its waters until it becomes a de-
stroying force, so did the rising tide of indignation against 
the East give to certain shrewd individuals a power that 
threatened disaster to the region. 
Jay had said that these western people believed almost to 
a. man that God Almighty had made this river for them to go to 
the sea by. And when the issue was firmly established by an 
order which reached Congress in June, 1784, from Madrid 
reading: "Until the limits of Louisiana and the two Floridas 
shall be settled and determined with the United States of America, 
his Majesty commands that you should give the states and Congress 
to understand that they are not to expose to process and 
confiscation the vessels which they carryon commerce on the 
, 
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River Mississippi inasmuch as a treaty concluded between the 
United States and England, on which the fo~er ground their 
pretensions to the navigation of that river could not fix lim-
its in a territory which that power did not possess, the two 
borders of the river being already conquered and possessed by 
our arms the day the treaty was made, namely the 30th 
November, 1782. This order I communicate to you that you may 
conform yourself thereto."49 
One letter may be quoted as an expression of opinion that 
prevailed so widely in the West: "To give us the liberty 
of transporting our effects down the river to New Orleans and 
then be subject to the Spanish laws and impositions, is an 
insult upon our understanding. We know, by woeful experience, 
that it is in their power, when once there, to take our 
produce at any price they please. Large quantities of flour, 
tobacco, meal &c have been taken there last summer, and mostly 
confiscated. 1150 
To present the full story of the relationship of 
Kentuckians and Spaniards of this period is manifestly impossi-
ble. Bearing in mind the fact that the rank and file of the 
Kentucky people were concerned only in solving a great economic 
p~oblem, it fOllows, then, that the thing that we need concern 
ourselves most with is the activities and attitudes of their 
leaders. One man of great influence, however, stands apart 
from the rest. Of his traitorous dealings there is little 
49. Secret Journals of Congress, Vol. III, p. 517. (Galvez to 
Rendon, June 26, 1784. 
50. Secret Journals of Congress, Vol. IV (Foreign Affairs), p. 320. 
I ~ 
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doubt, though his purpose has sometimes been open to question. 
This ;ndividual, Brigadier-General James Wilkinson, had come 
to Lexington in 1784. He ·was only twenty-six but with a wealth 
of experience, not omitting intrigues, unusual for his age. 
During the Revolution he had been on General Gates 1 s staff 
. 
perhaps ·he had received valuable lessons in double-dealing 
there. He had participated in the Conway Cabal. The trace 
of distrugt that Eastern leaders seem always to have had for 
him, he mana~ed to dispel by an engaging manner, vigorous 
personality and undeniable ability. He came to Kentucky as the 
agent of a land company but seems early to have been a t tracted 
by the possibilities of the New Orleans trade. His plans are 
shrouded in the mixture of candor, duplicity and verboseness 
with which hi~ writings abound. 
In July, 1787, he went to New Orleans with a boat-load 
of Kentucky produce. The prohibition upon such commerce was 
well known in Kentucky; Wilkinson was certainly aware of it. 
One theory to account for his action is that he meant to defy 
the order, secure thereby an interview with Miro, the governor, 
and win him over to his plan of a combined commercial and 
political arrangement. CommerCially, it would mean a trade 
concession to Wilkinson, and to him alone. Politically, 
it would mean the promise of Wilkinson to secure a separation 
-of Kentucky from Virginia and its adherence to Spain. The 
constantly growing fear in the Spanish minds of trouble with 
their northern neighbors had been augmented by two inCidents, 
both occurring shortly before Wilkinson 1 s trip. The first 
grew out of the seizure at Natchez of a boat-load of Kentuclry 
products. North Carolina and Virginia had immediately protested 
- -~-=-----------------~--------------------------------~---
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to Congress demanding protection of their navigation rights. 51 
Later Colonel Thomas Green had written a letter from Lexington 
prophecying a descent upon New Orleans by the Americans. This 
letter had been intercepted by the Spaniards and presented 
by Gardoqui to Jay.52 That there was a real fear among the 
officials at New Orleans may be proved by the translated report 
of Intendant Navarro sent from New Orleans in 1785. He said: 
" ••• The intensity with which they are working to form a city 
and establish posts, and their immediate neighborhood to our 
posts of the Illinois, may be harmful to us some day, unless we 
shelter ourselves in time by promoting a numerous population in 
this province to observe and even to restrain their intentions." 53 
Whatever Wilkinson may have intended, he was eminently 
successful in storming the citadel of Spanish trade restrictions 
in New Orleans. His pleasing manner and eager frankness won 
over ' the governor and the intendant, Navarro. They listened 
to his plan and they were more than impressed when, to prove 
his sincerity, he offered to take an oath of allegiance to 
Spain and to leave in the vault of the Spaniards the proceeds 
of the sale of his first cargo. He submitted to the authorities 
a lengthy memorial which covers, in the florid manner one soon 
learns to associate with the man, the whole field of American 
and Spanish frontier relations. He sketched the dissatisfaction 
of the Kentuckians, the rapid growth of the West and their 
rising aggressiveness. He suggested the possibility of British 
initiative, with the consequent danger to Louisiana. He led 
51. Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. VI, p. 203. 
52. ibid., Vol. VI, pp. 199-262. 
53. Robertson, Louisiana under Spain, France and the United 
States, 1785-1807, 2 Vols., Cleveland, 1911, Vol. I, 
p. 244. 
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artfully to the question of whether it would not be better 
for Spain "by partial indulgence and an acconnnodating deport-
II 
ment to win the western region than to risk the danger of 
their rising aggressiveness under another power. He suggested 
that Gardoqui be instructed to remain firm in his stand upon the 
navigation question but that Spain might do well to remember 
that "in order to conciliate and prepare the minds of the 
western Americans~ tolerance will be good politics in certain 
political cases, offering it to a few parties of real influence." 
Honesty and truthfulness were never serious handicaps to 
Wilkinson, to judge from the memorial. "Be it known to your 
honors, that the Notables of Kentucky, the place of my resi-
dence, chafing under the inconveniences and privations they 
suffer through the restrictions placed on its commerce, suggested 
that I make this voyage in order to penetrate, if this were 
possible, the attitude of Spain toward this country and to 
discover, if this were practicable whether it would be agree-
able to admit us under its protection as vassals." Among 
all the charges brought against certain prominent Kentuckians, 
there is found no evidence to verify this charge that they 
inspired the voyage of Wilkinson. He concluded his memorial 
with three suggestions: First, secrecy with respect to the 
plan, and his connection with it. Second, the continuance in 
qffice of Miro, as Governor of Louisiana. Third, the appoint-
ment of Navarro to be minister to the American government. 54 
The oath of allegiance is likewise in the true Wilkinson 
54. This memorial may be examined in the Louisiana State 
Historical Society Publication, Vol. IX, No.1 and also in 
Bodley's Introduction to "Reprints of Littell's Political 
Transactions in Kentucky." These copies were obtained 
from the original in the Pontalba Collection. This . 
memorial is dated August 21, 1787. 
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style. Its chief value to the student lies in its application 
to the premise that insincerity and self-aggrandizement were 
compelling attributes of the man. To read it is to sUbstantiate 
the conviction that Wilkinson meant to use the Spaniard1s lack 
of informatiori regarding Kentucky to his own economic advantage, 
to gain trade concessions upon the false impression that he 
would be the means of winning the allegiance of Kentucky to the 
Spanish crown. Nothing could have been further from his 
purpose. Kentucky1s adherence to Spain would have meant the 
end of his coveted trade monoply, his sole purpose in furthering 
the whole design. 55 
There is a tendency to magnify the influence of Wilkinson 
in Kentucky and to attempt to connect all the impetuous 
statements and questionable acts in that district with his 
schemes. It is true that as a vigorous and self-assertive per-
sonality he was well known, but the attitude of the leaders 
toward him was not one of guilty connivance, but of appreciation 
for his supposed interest in the region. Kentucky was deceived 
by him as New Orleans was. To illustrate: he read befope the 
convention of 1788 what he purported to be his memorial to the 
Spanish. In reality it was an expurgated form of that memorial, 
containing only a recital of the woes of the Kentuckians, 
55. Whitaker, in his Spanish-American Frontier, accepts the 
idea that Wilkinson meant to detach Kentucky from the 
Union and to join it to Spain. But all evidence seems to 
point to the fact that Wilkinson meant to gain economic 
advantage and not political advancement, a course that 
could be best sensed by maintaining the situation as it was. 
W. R. Shepherd in his article "Wilkinson and the Spanish 
Conspiracy" (American Historical Review, Vol. IX, p. 490) 
discussed the discovery of the Spanish translations sent by 
Miro to Valdes, minister of war and treasurer of the Indies. 
They are in the Archivo-Historico-Naclonale at Madrid. The 
English original has never been located. 
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and praying that Spain would help them by permitting New Orleans 
to become their market. 56 To express their gratitude the 
Convention voted this resolution: IIResolved that this Conven-
tion highly approve the address presented by Gen'l James 
Wilkinson to the Governor and Intendant of Louisiana and that 
the President be requested to present him the thanks of the 
convention for the regard which he there l n manifested for the 
interest of the Western Country.1I 57 Wilkinson thereupon sent 
a copy of the minutes, as published in the Kentucky Gazette, to 
Miro, in order that Miro · might see for himself how well his 
interests were being served in Kentucky. 
Though Spain had not received with approval any of the 
proposals presented by Jay, she was not indifferent to the 
importance of a commercial understanding with America. In 
October, 1784, Floridablanca announced that he would send a 
commissioner to the United States who would discuss the commer-
cial questions, together with the Mississippi question and the 
problem of the boundaries • . Gardoqui was the commissioner 
selected. Congress again chose Jay to represent America and 
the discussions between these two men, abandoned two years 
before, were resumed. Gardoqui1s instructions on the boundary 
question were to present a claim to the territory from the 
Kentucky river west to the Mississippi. Concessions, however, 
might be made on this point. But upon the question of the 
navigation of the river, there should be no yielding. To Spain 
56. The memorial read before the convention of November 5, 1788, 
may be found in Marshall, Vol. I, p. 289. The stroke was 
bold enough to fix attention upon the man and to make him, 
more than ever, a great power in political circles, but 
stopped short of revealing how traitorous had been his 
dealings in New Orleans. 
57. Bodley, Vol. I, p. 445 (Reprinted from the Pontalba Papers) 
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should go the exclusive right of navigation where it ran between 
58 the Spanish banks. 
Jay was especially enjoined to assert the right of the 
United States "to their territorial bounds and the free naviga-
• 
tioD' of the Mississippi, from the source to the ocean, as 
established in the treaties with Grea t Britain. 1159. He was not 
to conclude anything until he had previously communicated 
it to Congress and received the approval of that body. At the 
first -meeting Jay presented the American claim to the naviga-
tion and to the boundary line of 310 as set forth in the 
treaty with England. The privilege of West Indian trade was 
also requested. Gardoqui intimated that there might be dis-
cussions upon the terr~torial issue, but that Spain must stand 
firm upon navigation. The Spanish commissioner sensed, evi-
dently, the difficult position in which Jay was placed. The 
southern delegates in Congress were concerned in keeping faith 
with the people of the Mississippi Valley. ~here was, in their 
minds, but one important problem under discussion with Spain. 
To the eastern delegates considerations of trade not connected 
with western rivers were of vital importance. Gardoqui wrote 
that some "men of judgment" in Congress thought that for the 
West to be too attractive would be a source of weakness for the 
whole country -- that it would be better to improve the 
n~vigation of the eastern rivers and make the nearer western 
regions more attractive. Some eastern interests, he found, 
were alarmed at the drain upon cheap labor. On the other hand, 
he was not at all willing to see the Westerners aroused to the 
58. 
59. 
Bemis, pp. 74 and 75. 
Resolution of July 20, 1785, Diplomatic Correspondence 
(Blair Edition}, Vol. VI, p. 102. 
s 
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point of being a menace to Spanish settlements. 60 He proposed 
to placate American sentiment on the subject of the West, by 
special reciprocity tariff clauses between Spain and the United 
States, and by a treaty covering commerce and boundary, but not 
mentioning the navigation of the Mississippi. That would 
establish the principle of the river's being denied to every-
body.61 By this time the interest in the possibility of state-
hood had assumed noticeable proportions and as shrewd an 
observer as Gardoqui would not fail to be aware of the increased 
prestige of Kentucky, should she gain her desire. 
The weeks of conferences and discussions that followed 
led finally, in the summer of 1786, to a compromise treaty 
plan which was presented to Congress. The major points were a 
thirty year commercial agreement, a guarantee by each of the 
territory of the other in America, agreement by Spain to 
purchase each year in America a quantity of hard wood, paying 
for it in cash specie, and finally an agreement by Spain to 
mediate between the United States and Great Britain for our 
recovery of the Northwest Posts. It was an attempt to win the 
American people to the support of a treaty with Spain without 
~ecuring the coveted navigation. "Hard money" was scarce 
in the States; the condition would be remedied by the hardwood 
purchases. The presence of the British in the Northwes~ 
was an irritant to American pride; Spain promised to help, 
even to the extent of force of arms, in their removal. To 
Jay the advantages of the commercial treaty were obvious, 
60. Gardoqui to Conde de Galvez, Viceroy of Mexico, August 
23, 1785 (Bemis, p. 84). 
61. Gardoqui to Florldablanca, August 23, 1785 (Bemis, P. 84). 
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as they were to the east. Yet he had been too much in touch 
with southern and western sentiment not to realize the value, 
to them, of their claim. To insure, if possible, the success 
of the treaty in the Congress, Jay suggested that this country 
forebear to use the river for thirty years. If the demands of 
the west could be amicably resisted for that period, time 
would probably solve the problem. It was a heavy price, but no 
treaty with Spain would likewise be a disaster. It must be 
remembered, however, that Jay's instructions had been explicit 
in the matter of navigation. It was felt that the treaty, as 
it stood, was doomed to defeat, since the Articles of 
Confederation required nine votes to ratify. Might a majority of 
states repeal instructions with reference to a treaty, when 
nine were required to ratify? The discussion waxed warm; 
the pent up intensity of feeling over the matter burst forth. 
Jay was called upon to explain his plan. The eastern delegates 
pointed out our danger from without. We had no army and no 
navy; a treaty with Spain was imperative. The vote was taken. 
By seven states to five, Deleware being unrepresented, it was 
decided to repeal that part of the instructions relative to 
the Mississippi navigation. 62 
On October 6, 1786, Jay wrote Gardoqui that "in consequence 
of · some recent acts I find myself more in capacity than I was, 
to make and receive propositions relative to certain matters 
in difference between our countries.,,63 
As a consequence of their renewed discussions there was 
62. For the debates in Congress see the Journal of the 
Continental Congress, Vol. IV. 
63. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1783-1789, Vol. VI, p. 196. 
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formed the following agreement. "It is especially stipulated 
and concluded that his Catholic majesty and the United States 
are freely and in common and without any interruption from each 
other, to use and navigate the said river from its source down 
to the southern boundary of the said states, and that the 
United States will faithfully observe the l1mitations and not 
navigate or use the said river belOW,· or farther down than the 
said boundary, in any part of its course through his majestiets 
countries to the mouth of the river. 64 
On April 4, 1787, Congress called upon Jay for a report as 
to the progress being made in the· Spanish negotiations. He 
could offer no assurance of success with reference to the 
Mississippi question, but was hopeful that a satisfactory 
adjustment might be made about the boundary.65 The state of af-
fairs was growing more complicated. The Annapolis Convention 
had given promise of a new government. Gardoqui had felt the 
futility of the situation and had asked for a leave of absence 
64. Gardoqui to Floridablanca, Confidential #12, September 8, 
1786. 
65. Censure, such as might have been expected, met these 
agreements. Monroe wrote Governor Patrick Henry under 
a New York date line of August 12, 1786: " ••• Upon my 
arrival here in Decr last (having been previously well 
acquainted with Mr. Jay) in conversation with him I found 
he bad agreed with Gardoqui to postpone the subject of 
the Mississippi &c, in the first instance and to take up 
that of a commercial treaty; that in this they had gone 
so far as that Mr. Jay was possessed of the principles 
on which he wo d agree to make it, upon condition on our 
part of the forebearance of the use of the Mississippi 
for 25 or 30 years. I soon found in short, that Mr. Jay 
was desirous of occluding the Mississippi and of making 
what he termed advantageous terms in the treaty of 
commerce the means of affecting it ••• From that time, 
and I had reason to believe he had begun even before 
my arrival, we have known of his intriguing with the 
members to carry the pOint." (Writings of Jas. Monroe--
edited by S. M. Hamilton -- Vol. VI, pp. 144 and 145). 
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while the new government was pending. From that time, aside 
from desultory discussions in Congress and in political 
centers outside, the Jay-Gardoqui treaty was reckoned as a 
hopeless issue. It was a feeble and flickering end to a most 
dramatic story in our early national history. In it we find 
the powerful influence of a remote and undeveloped region, 
a prophecy of the rising importance of the West. Though the 
diplomatic contest in the East was not without its interesting 
phases, it was in the West that the action was most animated, 
the actors most thoroughly a part of the play, and the plot, 
most subtly woven. 
Miro seemed to have been thoroughly won over to the scheme 
of Wilkinson and to have seen in it verification of his theories 
concerning the protection of Louisiana. He wrote to Madrid in 
1788: "The delivering up of Kentucky into his master's hands, 
which is the main object to which Wilkinson has promised to 
devote himself entirely would forever constitute this province 
a rampart for the protection of New Spain • • • 
"The western people would no longer have any inducement 
to emigrate, if they were put in possession of a free trade 
with us. This is the reason why this privilege should be 
granted only to a few individuals having influence among them, 
as ·is suggested in Wilkinson's memorial, because on their 
~eeing the advantages bestowed on these few, they might be 
easily persuaded to acquire the like by becoming Spanish 
subjects.,,66 
Our interest in Wilkinson, in this paper, is primarily in 
66. Despatch of January 8, 1788 -- Miro to Valdes. 
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connection with his relationship -to the disaffection among the 
Kentuckians. After 1788 circumstances tended to weaken his 
position, both in Kentucky and in Louisiana. It was generally 
believed that the admission of the district was but a matter 
of a short time, upon which the major problems might wait. 
He could not carry on indefinitely his double deceit and so, 
as the new government of the United States was being put into 
operation we find him writing: "I discovered that the proposed 
new government of the United States had inspired some with ap-
prehension, and others with hopes -- so much so that I saw that 
this circumstance would be a cause of some opposition and delay. 
I also perceived that all idea that Kentucky would subject 
itself to Spain must be abandoned for the present, and that 
the only feasible plan to the execution of which I had to direct 
my attention was that of a separation from the United States, 
and an alliance with Spain, on conditions which could not yet 
be defined with precision." 67 
The whole episode was but another chapter in the adventurous 
career of Wilkinson, an episode that was colorful but of little 
real influence in the history of the West. Where correspondence 
and conferences with other Kentuckians have been proved, 
they reveal only a tendency to enlist all who would work to 
solve Kentucky1s problems. What these other Kentuckians had 
i~ mind, no one can definitely say. Widely separated purposes 
have been read into their letters, their transactions, and 
their statements. The student can only study them for himself 
67. Wilkinson to Miro, February 12, 1789 (Charles Gayarre, 
History of Louisiana, Spanish Domination, 4 Vols., New York, 
1866, Vol. II, p. 223. 
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and draw his o\vn conclusions. 
The evidence which has been advanced to prove the exist-
erice of a Spanish Conspiracy centers around the activities of" 
a small group of men living in Kentucky and of the delegate 
" to Congress~ John Brown. One member of this group of in-
fluential Kentuckians was Harry Innes, Attorney-General for 
the K~ntucky District. Governor Randolph, on May 1, 1788, wrote 
to him asking that he "institute proper legal inquiries" 
concerning the infractions of peace on the part of certain 
Kentuckians who had t~ken upon themselves the privilege of 
punishing, by a raid, a group of Indians who had a short time 
before made a marauding expedition upon several Kentucky 
settlements. Judge Innes replied upon July 21, 1787, acknowl-
edging the receipt of the Governor 1 s letter upon July 6th. 
He expressed himself mystified as to the measures to be taken, 
since he had no executive powers, and that to act in a 
private capacity would render him "odious." He did not under-
stand, he said "of whom he was to enquire, or against whom he 
should institute persecution. 1I He proceeded to describe 
frontier conditions and the danger from the Indians and con-
cluded: liThe Indians have been very troublesome on our fron-
tiers, and still continue to molest us, from which circumstances 
I am decidedly of opinion that this western country will in a 
few years Revolt from the Union and endeavor to erect an 
independent government; for under the present system we cannot 
exert our strength, neither does the Congress seem disposed to 
protect us, for we are informed that those very troops which 
Congress directed the several states to raise for the defense of 
the western country, are disbanded. I have just dropptd this 
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hint to your excellency for ma t ter of reflection. If some step 
is not taken for our protection a little time will prove the 
truth of the opinion.,,68 Historians convinced of the existence 
of a Spanish Conspiracy have made much of this letter. There 
are passages in the letter, it is true, that indicate the 
possibility of a drastic move on the part of the western country. 
But it would not be reasonable to assume, surely, that a man 
interested in furthering a revolt would announce that intention 
to the governor of his state several months in advance of the 
act. Would not a better explanation be that he wished, by 
magnifying the gravity of the situation, to gain additional 
consideration for the section? Exasperation often leads to 
exaggerated statements, which are not necessarily to be con-
strued in their strictest sense. 
The evidence used to prove a Spanish Conspiracy includes 
also the activities of John Bro\~, d elegate from Kentucky to 
the Congress. His conferences with Gardoqui and the reports 
made to at least two prominent Kentuckians are the basis for 
this charge. 
68. Virginia Calendar of State Papers, Vol. IV, p. 322 . 
Reprinted also in Bodley's Introduction to Littell, 
No . X in Appendix but differing from the letter received 
by Randolph in that the words "Revolt from the Union tl 
are not included. The letter used by Littell was from 
a copy retained by Innes, presumably the first draft, when 
he dispatched his warning to Randolph. In 1806 an edi-
torial in the "Western World ll charged four men in Kentucky, 
Wilkinson, Innes, Sebastian and Brown, with having been 
implicated in a separatist plot. Littell's book is written 
in defense of these men, especially of Innes and Brown. 
Whether Innes altered the copy of the letter submitted to 
Littell or whether he had attached little importance 
to the difference in the two wordings, the student must 
decide for himself. The most damaging of the two manu-
scripts is used here, since it seems the most authentic, 
but its admission as evidence does not prove a "Spanish 
Conspiracy." 
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The evidence rests largely on letters to two men. To one, 
Samuel McDowell, president of each of the eight conventions, 
he wrote: "In a conversation I had with Mr. Gardoqui, the 
Spanish Minister, relative to the navigation of the Mississippi, 
he stated that if the people of Kentucky would erect themselves 
into an independent state, and appoint a proper person to 
negotiate with him, he had authority for that purpose and would 
enter into an arrangement with them for the exportation of their 
produce to New Orleans on terms of mutual advantage."69 The 
letter to Muter is likewise of interest, "In private conferences 
which I had with Mr. Gardoqui, the Spanish minister at this 
place, I have been assured by h~ in the most explicit terms, 
that if Kentucky will declare her independence and empower some 
proper person to negotiate with him, that he has authority and 
will engage to open the navigation of the Mississippi for the 
exportation of their produce on terms of mutual advantage; but 
that privilege can never be extended to them while part of the 
United States, by reason of commercial treaties existing be-
tween that Court and other powers of Europe. As there is no 
reason to doubt the sincerity of this declaration, I have thought 
proper to communicate it to a few confidential friends in the 
district, with his permission, not doubting but they will make 
prudent use of the information which is in part confirmed by 
d~spatches yesterday received by Congress from Mr. Carmichael, 
our minister at that court, the contents of which I am not at 
69. The above letter was quoted from memory by McDowell in a 
letter published in the Palladium (Frankfort) of Augus t 7, 
1806. It is reprinted in Brown, Political Beginnings, 
Appendix, No. V. 
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liberty to disclose.,,70 Brown continued with the statement that 
the movement for statehood had gone too far to be abandoned, 
and that the need for admission into the Union was too great 
to await ·the long delays. He attributed the failure to achieve 
statehood at that time as due to "the jealousy of the growing 
importance of the western country, and an unwillingness to 
add a vote to the southern interest." It would appear that 
Brown was assiduously following the instructions that he keep 
in touch with the developments in the capital. It is signif-
icant that he sent to McDowell the more cautious of these 
two letters. In all the flurry connected with the Spanish 
question no hint of suspicion was ever directed toward McDowell. 
To Muter, Brown evidently felt that he could be more confi-
dential. To McDowell he said: Separate from Virginia and 
Spain will treat with you in a manner advantageous to both 
upon the navigation question. To Muter he said: Spain holds 
that it will be necessary to separate from the United States 
to secure the things we desire. 
A study of other letters may be a help in arriving at a 
decision. One of the most incriminating is from Gardoqui to 
Floridablanca. He wrote: " ••• This determination (i.e. 
to delay granting separation to Kentucky) was very distasteful 
to those who promoted the separation of the district, and 
p~rticularly to Mr. John Brown, a landed proprietor and 
resident in that district, who was interested in that matter, 
among others, as member in Congress •••• Foreseeing some of 
70. Brown to Muter -- July 10, 1788. Marshall, the historian, 
had this letter from Muter. See Marshall, Vol. I, p. 307. 
, 
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these occurrences, I took occasion during the past year to 
cultivate the acquaintance of the aforesaid Brown and to intro-
duce such topics as I thought would produce good results. 
"Our friendship gradll:ally increased and my sentiments 
naturally made an impression on him, inasmuch as they touched 
upon those obstacles imposed by our treaties with other nations 
which forbade us according any extension in favor of his section 
of the country while pertaining to the United States, artfully 
insinuating that only themselves could remove this difficulty; 
inasmuch as if separated they would afford excuse for regarding 
them as an interior district without maritime designs, and 
perhaps we could devise some plan of adjusting the markets 
so much needed in some of our possessions. I carefully observed 
his appearance as I told him this, and it seemed to me that 
I could discern the satisfaction that it gave. I repeated 
(several days later) the same and other observations. He seemed 
quite satisfied and obliged to me, and admitted, in confidence, 
that he had, by a messenger who had left some days before, 
communicated to his constituents the decisions of Congress 
concerning the separation ••• He told me, in conclusion, that 
this month the convention would meet and that he expected it 
would resolve upon the erection of an independent state; that 
he expected to leave this place the 1st of August, and that he 
~ould arrive in time to inform and aid what he had discussed 
with me, for he deems it a very fit and important subject for 
consideration, and for the present he thanked me for himself 
and in the name of all the country, which would be under lasting 
71 
obligations to me ••• " Another letter involving Brown was 
71. Gardoqui to Floridablanca, No. 279, July 25, 1788. 
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written by Miro to Valdes. ft ••• Oliver Pollock, a citizen 
of Philadelphia, who arrived here three days ago in a vessel 
from Martinique, has disclosed to me that Bro\vn, a member of 
Congress, who is a ·man of property in Kentucky, told him in 
confidence that, in the debates of that body on the question of 
the independence of that territory, he saw clearly that the 
intention of his colleagues was, that Kentucky should remain 
under the jurisdiction of Congress, like the county of Illinois, 
and that a governor should be appointed by them for that 
province as for the other; but that, as this was opposed to the 
welfare of the inhabitants of Kentucky, he was determined to 
return home, and on his arrival, to call for a general assembly, 
of his fellow citizens, in order to proceed immediately to 
declare themselves independent, and to propose to Spain the 
opening of a commercial intercourse with reciprocal advantages; 
and that, to accomplish this object, he would send to Pollock 
the necessary documents, to be laid before me and to be forwarded 
to your excellency • 
• • 
Of the Gardoqui letter to Floridablanca it is possible to 
make too much. Assuming that Brovm felt a greater obligation 
to work for the interest of the section than to attempt to 
maintain its connection with the United States, there is nothing 
to warrant the assertion that he was working for an alliance 
with Spain. The letter is largely a statement of Gardoqui1s 
opinion as to the impression he had made upon Brown. As a 
glimpse into the character and mode of operation of the 
Spaniard it is valuable. But as proof of a Spanish Conspiracy 
72. Miro to Valdes, Nov. 3, 1788. 
(Gayarre, Louisiana, Vol. I, p. 222.) 
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it is sadly unconvincing. In this letter, as in the Miro letter 
above, the Spanish officials fail to appreciate the first con-
sideration in the minds of the Kentuckians -- that of statehood. 
Organized as a - state, they might successfully cope with the 
problem of navigation and market. But to desire a union with 
Spain as an end within itself was opposed to the very essence 
of the frontier nature. It was to that grandiose Spanish 
concept that Wilkinson appealed, and the response must have been, 
to him, most gratifying. But in Kentucky were men who were 
carrying on the fight for their section's interests in the face 
of combined indifference and jealousy on the part of the East 
and daring to say and do those things which the occa sions 
demanded. With the exception of Wilkinson's case there is no 
evidence that any of these men expected to profit politically 
or financially from the separatist movement. Indeed their 
action might be deemed as springing from an ideal of patriotism 
rather than from selfish motives. The frontiersman has ever 
been inclined to put his local community, rather than the nation, 
in the foreground of his interests. 
Admitting, then, the doubtful nature, in the light of 
national interests, of Brown's activities, there is nothing to 
justify the contention that he was a party to or an organizer 
of a conspiracy. Aside from two letters, written in confidence 
w~th a request for information, and several letters by 
Spanish officials who never understood the situation, there 
is no basis for charges against him. The following statement 
by an unfriendly historian regarding the Gardoqui letter seems 
totally unwarranted: "Eve, as she looked with fascinated eye 
upon the hateful head and deadly coils of the arch enemy of 
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man, did not more easily nor more eagerly succumb.,,73 The idea 
so firmly implanted in the minds of the general reader of 
Kentuckyts history, that there was a Spanish Conspiracy, is 




Isaac Shelby, the first governor of Kentucky, in a deposition 
Green, Spanish Conspiracy, p. 160. 
The high place which Brown held and'continued to hold in 
the esteem of men of prominence, is illustrated in a 
letter from Madison to Mann Butler, Kentucky Historian: 
Dear Sir--
Montpelier, Oct. 11, 1834. 
flI have received your letter of the 21st ult. in which 
you wish to obtain my recollections of what passed between 
Mr. Brown and me in 1788 on the overtures of Gardoqui 
'that if the people of Kentucky will erect themselves into 
an independent state, and appoint a proper person to 
negotiate with him, he had authority for that purpose and 
would enter into an arrangement with them for the exporta-
tion of their produce to New Orleans.' 
"My recollection, with which reference to my manu-
script papers accords, leaves no doubt but that the 
overture was communicated to me by Mr. Brown. Nor can I 
doubt that, as stated by him, I expressed the opinion and 
apprehension that a knowledge of it in Kentucky, might 
in the excitement there, be mischievously employed. This 
view of the subject resulted from the natural ,and well-
knovm impatience of the people on the waters of the 
Mississippi for a market for the products of their exuberant 
soil; from a distrust of the Federal policy, produced by 
the project for surrendering the use of the river for a 
term of years; and from a coincidence of the overture in 
point of time, with the plan on foot for consolidating 
the Union by arming it with new powers, an object, to 
embarrass and defeat which, the dismembering aims of 
Spain would not fail to make the most tempting sacrifices, 
and to spare no intrigues. 
"I owe it to Mr. Brown, with whom I was in intimate 
friendship, when we were associated in public life, to 
observe that I have always regarded him, whilst steadily 
attentive to the interests of his constituents, as duly 
impressed with the importance of the Union, and anxious 
for its prosperity. I pray you to accept with my respects, 
my cordial salutations. 
"Mann Butler, Esq . 
"Signed 
James Madison" 
(Collins, History of Kentucky, Vol. I, p. 328) 
Upon the admission of Kentucky, Brovm was made one of the 
first United States senators. He had previously served as 
United States senator from Virginia. 
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in the suit of Innes against Marshall said: "I was a member 
of nearly all the early conventions held at Danville but can not 
certify the particular years. I have a recollection of most 
of the important subjects that were discussed. In no conven-
tion of which I was a member did I ever hear a motion or 
proposition made by any member to separate Kentucky from the 
United states and form a connection with Spain. Such a propo-
sition, in my opinion, and the author of -it, would have been 
treated with scorn and contempt in every convention of which 
I was a member." 75 
Certainly not everybody who had discussions with Gardoqui 
could be accused of conspiracy in the western question. Governor 
Randolph was evidently in communication with Gardoqui through 
Madison. -In a letter to Randolph, Madison said: "... The 
information which you wished to go to Mr. Gardoqui has been 
communicated. The real impression made by it cannot be seen 
through the political veil. If he views the state of western 
affairs in the true light, his representations to Spain must 
convince her that she has no option but between concession and 
hostilities. It is to be lamented that so many circumsmnces 
have concurred to enlist her pride on the side of the latter 
alternative. ,,76 
In this period of tremendous change and adjustment in 
~erica, the price of leadership was frequently the severest of 
condemnation. Hamilton and Jefferson knew it; Jay returned 
to the country following the signing of the treaty with 
75. Deposition in Mercer County Court, August t 1813. Printed 
in Brown, p. 166. 
76. Madison to Randolph -- April 2, 1787 (Madison Papers, Vol. 
II, p. 629). 
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England to be met with a storm of abuse. But it was the 
peculiar misfortune of the Kentuckians that the slander has, 
in many quarters, followed them to the present time. But 
whatever· the cost to them, their section received the reward 
of their .efforts. The formation of a new state and the open-
ing of the Mississtppl, issues treated with indifference in 
the East, were soon to remove those experiments so fatal to 
nationalism .. 
57 
statehood and Navigation Concluded 
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In oonolusion, Kentuoky, faith~u1 to Amerioa but seeking 
her own interests also, felt that t~ey oould best be obtained 
through statehood in the Union, not outside. Her leaders kept 
an eye open to other possibilities but they never were brought 
to the point of despairing of seeing their aims aocomp1ished 
by legal means. The new oonstitution, oombining national 
authority with looal self-government held out hopes of Kentuoky1s 
aohieving both her aims -- liberty in the eoonomic and in the 
politioal sense. These hopes soon were fulfilled. 
Kentucky1s two problems, developing through the early 
frontier period together and together threatening the destiny 
of the seotion, were brought to satisfaotory oonclusion but 
three years apart. After 1789, the story of statehood lacks 
the dramatic nature of the earlier peri04. Persistence with 
patience rather than impatienoe, marks its pages. The 
Kentuoky Convention of 1789 asked Virginia again to pave the way 
for statehood. The Virginia legislature complied; Congress 
passed an aot, February 4, 1791, providing for admission on 
June 1, 1792. The struggle was over. Kentuoky, so long 
acoustomed to settling her own affairs quietly passed into 
her new position . 
The companion story, more complioated, oannot be adequa t e-
ly treated here. Its national and international oharacter 
made necessary the delays which the frontiersmen had come to 
know so well. The oonsummation of the treaty with Spain, 
attempted so many years before by Jay, had several oontributing 
factors. The Nooka Crisis with England had produoed considerable 
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uneasiness in Spain. 77 The possibility of trouble with the two 
English speaking nations at once was doubly alarming. 
Carmichael, the American charge des affaires, had been in-
structed to hammer ceaselessly upon the idea of a treaty, and 
to add strength to our position, France was persuaded to use 
her influence in our behalf. 
In 1794, came our treaty with England into which the over-
wrought minds of the Spanish diplomats read a secret clause 
against Spain. Briefly and succinctly has Bemis summed up the 
situation when he framed as the accompanying title to his recent 
book, "Pinckney's Treaty" the phrase "America's Advantages 
from Europe 1 s Distress.,,78 
On January 11, 1792, President Washington transmitted to 
the Senate the text of a report from the Secretary of State 
as to the advisability of reopening the negotiations with 
Spain. 79 In an accompanying note, the President nominated 
William Short, charge des affaires at Paris, to work with 
Carmichael. Later at the-rather childish request of Spain a 
man of "more dignity and rank ll was appointed to head the dele-
gation. Thomas Pinckney of the famous South Carolina family 
was selected and to him is ascribed the honor of the treaty 
of 1795. 
The settlement of the long negotiation over the Mississ-
ippi navigation is found in Article IV: "It is likewise 




For a discussion of this incident, see Bemis, Jay1s Treaty, 
New York, 1923, pp. 52-78. 
For a thorough and readable account of these later years 
of the negotiations, see Bemis, Pinckney1 s Treaty. 
American State Papers, Vol. I, No. 55. 
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separates them from the Spanish colony of Louisiana, is the 
middle of the channel or bed of the River Mississippi from the 
northern boundary of the said states to the completion of the 
thirty-first degree of latitude North of the Equator; and his 
Catholic Majesty has likewise agreed that the navigation of the 
said River in its whole breadth from its source to the ocean, 
shall be free only to his subjects and the citizens of the 
United States, unless he should extend this privilege to the 
subjects of other ·powers by special convention."SO 
Spainls contention to her sole right to the navigation 
of the lower Mississippi was thus consistently maintained. 
The article agreed to by Spain bears more the nature of a grant 
than a recognition of right. The recognition that Spain 
tacitly made was, that her period of domination in America 
was over; henceforth she must stand aside for the rising power 
here. Kentucky with a spirit now idealistic, now selfish, but 
always aggressive, was a symbol for the irresistible march of 
the new nation upon the West. 
80. For the text of this treaty in both English and Spanish, 
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